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GIVING STATE TAX INCENTIVES TO
CORPORATIONS:
HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?
Kathleen E. McDavid*
INTRODUCTION
The South has traditionally attracted multinational automakers
for many reasons; the South boasts notoriously low labor costs, cheap
land, skilled industrial workers, and auto parts manufacturers between
Atlanta and Virginia along Interstate 85.1
Today, however,
multinational corporations have a new reason to look to the South as a
prime location incentive packages. “Typically, jurisdictions offer
incentive packages that include income and sales-tax reductions,
employment-based tax credits, land preparation, worker-training
subsidies, and relaxation of existing environmental and zoning laws.”2
South Carolina uses targeted tax incentives in an attempt to
stimulate the economy and create jobs within the state.
Targeted tax incentives . . . are fiscal tools
designed to attract a private firm to a new location,
help support or expand an existing business, or to
prevent a company from relocating to another city or
state. . . . While these policies are common among
state governments, the efficacy of these policies has
been called into question over and over again by
many scholars and policy makers.3

*

Class of 2011, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A.,
Furman University. The author would like to thank the members of SCJILB
for their editing efforts and the improvement of this note.
1
OUTLOOK ’96: THE ECONOMY; BMW Follows a Trend to the
Southeast, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1996, at C12, available at 1996 WLNR
4357471; see also James Bennet, Company News; Mercedes Selects Alabama
Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at D1, available at 1993 WLNR 3344209
(listing reasons auto makers build plants in the South).
2
Gary Biglaiser & Claudio Mezzetti, Incentive Auctions and Information
Revelation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 145, 145 (2000).
3
PETER T. CALCAGNO & FRANK HEFNER, UNLEASHING CAPITALISM: A
PRESCRIPTION fOR ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 131 (S.C.
Policy Council Educ. Found., 2009).
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This article will begin by giving an overview of the recent
history of the use of tax incentives in the South to lure corporations.
More specifically, this article will examine BMW’s and Boeing’s
choice to set up shop in South Carolina and Mercedes-Benz’s choice to
build in Alabama. Next, this article will scrutinize the economic
impact that state tax incentives have on the states themselves by
looking at typical arguments that economic proponents use. Using
BMW as a case study, this article will analyze the employment and
income opportunities BMW has offered the community. Furthermore,
this article will investigate BMW’s training programs, research skill
tutorials, and advanced facility to determine how the company itself has
worked to boost the state’s economy. In examining the opponents’
arguments against state tax incentives, this article offers economists’
arguments, which assert that bringing corporations into a state that does
not have the knowledge base, skills, or tools necessary to compete is
essentially a state buying jobs for its citizens.
In addition, this article will examine the governmental impact
that state tax incentives have on state government. Recently, Boeing
has, in effect, collapsed South Carolina’s state government and limited
transparency by securing one of the biggest economic deals to ever
come to the state by way of a top-secret transaction. This article also
provides an opportunity-cost analysis, as well as a section balancing
whether positive externalities can outweigh a state’s expenditure of
scarce tax dollars. Then, this article will examine a recently passed
piece of legislation, the South Carolina Economic Development
Competitiveness Act of 2010, and its possible positive and negative
effects on the state. Finally, this article will conclude with an argument
that opponents of state tax incentives lean on when their backs are
against the wall: the Dormant Commerce Clause.
I. RECENT HISTORY OF THE USE OF TAX INCENTIVES TO LURE
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS TO THE SOUTH
A. BMW IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The BMW Manufacturing Company chose South Carolina as the
site for its $625 million automobile-assembly plant in 1992. South
Carolina offered BMW an incentive package worth $150 million in
exchange for the 2,000 jobs BMW predicted it would create.4 The
4

John J. Garman, The New War Between the States: A Look at the
Incentives to Recruit Foreign Automakers to the South, Daimlerchrysler Corp.
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incentives that South Carolina offered included an employment training
program, “where South Carolina provided ‘all hand tools, manuals and
classroom facilities’ and hired instructors required for training.
Additionally, South Carolina agreed to manage the recruiting,
screening, and testing of potential plant employees.” 5 Finally, South
Carolina invested an additional $40 million to modernize and extend
the runway at a nearby airport.6
Spartanburg, South Carolina attracted BMW with “promises of
an eager, technically trained work force, the proximity of both the port
of Charleston and numerous automotive suppliers, tax incentives, and a
favorable climate.”7 The anti-trade-union climate in South Carolina
also added to the state’s attractiveness because “BMW wish[ed] to
avoid a bruising fight against organized labor.”8
BMW now employs 5,000 people at its Spartanburg, South
Carolina plant and “estimates its investments through June [2008] at
$6.3 billion—including $2.1 billion through suppliers.”9
B. MERCEDES-BENZ IN ALABAMA
Mercedes-Benz chose Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, as the site
of its first automobile assembly plant in 1993. In April of that year,
Mercedes-Benz announced that it intended to open the assembly plant,
which would provide Alabama with 1,500 jobs. The prospect of the
new plant had launched a five-month bidding war between almost

v. Cuno, and the European Union’s Prohibition Against State Aid, 24 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 313, 333 (2007) (citing Krystal Miller, BMW to Build Factory
in U.S., Employ 2,000: Firm’s First Plant Outside Germany to Make Cars in
South Carolina in 1995, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1992, at A2).
5
Garman, supra note 4, at 333 (quoting Robert M. Ady, Why BMW
Cruised into Spartanburg, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1992, at A).
6
Id.
7
Doron P. Levin, What BMW Sees In South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 1993, at 3, available at 1993 WLNR 3417888.
8
Id.; see also Aviation and the South: Advantage Dixie, ECONOMIST, Jan.
9, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 428479 (citing “anti-trade-union climate” as
a common attraction for corporations in southern states).
9
Bruce Smith, S.C. Governor Signs Incentive Package for Boeing, USA
TODAY
(Oct.
30,
2009,
7:57
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/manufacturing/2009-10-30-boeingsc_N.htm.
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thirty states.10 Alabama eventually wooed the automaker, and
Mercedes-Benz planned to “produce 60,000 vehicles at the [Alabama]
plant—about a third as many as the average American assembly plant
ma[de].”11
Mercedes-Benz chose Alabama not only for the attractiveness of
the region in the vicinity of many auto manufacturers, but also for
Tuscaloosa’s advanced transportation infrastructure.12 Mercedes-Benz
planned to import many auto parts and to export two-thirds of the
plant’s production. An interstate highway and a railroad line run by the
Tuscaloosa site, and the port of Mobile lies two-hundred miles away.13
C. BOEING IN SOUTH CAROLINA
After automakers, the aircraft industry also became attracted to
the South’s anti-union climate. Boeing had operated its first assembly
line in Everett, Washington. “Machinists there went on a 57-day
walkout in 2008 that cost the company more than $2 billion and led
some airlines to switch their orders to Europe’s Airbus.” 14 In 2009,
Boeing, decided to break ties with the fractious labor union in
Washington, announced that it would build a $750 million factory in
North Charleston, South Carolina. 15 To further its goals of “flexibility
and . . . stability in their supply chain,” Boeing will replicate the
manufacturing of all plane parts produced in Washington, allowing the
South Carolina plant to operate independently from Washington. 16
In addition to having “one of the lowest rates of unionization in
the country,” South Carolina has much to offer in North Charleston—
proximity to an international airport and port facilities. Despite
Boeing’s doubts about South Carolina’s work force and history of
political friction, Boeing chose South Carolina as the location for its
new assembly line.17

10

Bennet, supra note 1; see also James Bennet, Company News; Mercedes
to Announce Site for U.S. Plant Next Week, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at D3,
available at 1993 WLNR 3434150.
11
Bennet, supra note 1, at D1.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Aviation, supra note 8.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Andy Shain, S.C. Traveled a Long Road to Land Boeing, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Nov. 1, 2009, at B1.
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The economic impact of Boeing’s new plant in North Charleston
is welcome in a state with an 11.6% unemployment rate, the sixth
highest in the nation.18 South Carolina offered Boeing an incentive
package worth more than $450 million. Boeing is estimated to employ
3,800 workers by 2015. Boeing initially invested $750 million, and
Boeing and its suppliers are expected to invest $10 billion directly and
indirectly over the next fifteen years.19
D. OTHER WAYS STATES USE TAX INCENTIVES
Some states have been creative in their use of state tax
incentives. For example, thirty-eight “states have passed incentive
packages to bolster economic development associated with the
entertainment industries or quell ‘runway productions’—projects
intended to appear on screen as certain geographical areas but shot
elsewhere.”20 So, states like Louisiana and New Mexico offer
incentives to film companies wanting to produce a movie in Texas, and
those film companies settle for scenery that looks like Texas because it
comes with an enticing incentives package. 21 South Carolina also
offers generous film incentives in the form of an employee wage
rebate, South Carolina supplier rebate, sales tax exemption, no location
fee for using State properties, and a Motion Picture Tax Credit. These
incentives are subject to approval by the South Carolina Film
Commission and only require a $500 application fee.22 Other states,
especially in the past ten years, have been offering incentives to
companies who help promote state objectives. For example, some
states give incentives to companies that reduce their carbon dioxide
emissions or create renewable energy. 23
18

Levin, supra note 7.
Shain, supra note 17, at B1.
20
Deena Kalai, Feature: Now Showing!: Entertainment & Sports Law:
Does a Little Go a Long Way?: Texas Entertainment Industry Economic
Incentives, 71 TEX. B.J. 734, 735 (2008).
21
Id.
22
Production
Incentives,
S.C.
FILM
COMM’N,
http://www.filmsc.com/incentives/test123/default.aspx (last visited May 28,
2011).
23
Renewable Energy Tax Incentives, WASH. DEP’T OF REVENUE, Apr. 29,
2009,
http://www.commerce.wa.gov/DesktopModules/CTEDPublications/CTEDPubl
icationsView.aspx?tabID=0&ItemID=7355&MId=863&wversion=Staging
(giving options for companies in the state of Washington to receive tax
incentives for using or manufacturing certain levels of renewable energy); see
19
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II. ECONOMIC IMPACT: PROS AND CONS OF STATE TAX INCENTIVES
Competition among states to lure companies through tax
incentives provides no net gain to the United States economy. Each
state may appear better off competing for particular businesses with its
neighbor, but auctions for business leave the nation’s economy “with
less of both private and public goods than if such competition was
prohibited.”24 Using BMW’s eighteen years in Spartanburg, South
Carolina as an example, this section will examine the economic impact
a multinational corporation has had on a state that gave the corporation
a tax incentives package as a condition of locating there. 25
A. PROS: CAPITAL, INCOME AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF STATE TAX INCENTIVES
Proponents of state tax incentive programs argue that they
“reduce[] the inherently inefficient taxation of capital.” 26 While a
reduction of tax revenues does result when a state gives tax incentives,
the loss of state tax revenue is not necessarily bad for the economy at
large. When money remains in private hands, instead of being paid to
the state, investment and incomes increase because “consumers and

also California Incentives and Laws for EVs, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Feb. 19,
2010, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/progs/ind_state_laws.php/CA/ELEC.
24
CALCAGNO & HEFNER, supra note 3, at 133 (quoting M.L. BURSTEIN &
A.J. ROLNICK, CONGRESS SHOULD END THE ECONOMIC WAR AMONG THE
STATES, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 1994 Annual Report 9(1): 3-19
(1995)).
25
South Carolina’s BMW plant is a part of the BMW Group, who’s
Production Network spans twenty-three plants and twelve countries. The
Spartanburg plant, the only BMW plant in the United States, produces the
BMW X5 and X6 models, and the plant began production of the X3 in 2010 for
the global market. See Douglas P. Woodward & Paulo Guimarães, BMW in
South Carolina: An Update, 55(2) BUS. & ECON. REV., Sept. 2008, at 1, 1-3,
available
at
http://www.moore.sc.edu/UserFiles/moore/Documents/Division%20of%20Res
earch/BMWReportSept2008.pdf.
26
Tracy A. Kaye, The Gentle Art of Corporate Seduction: Tax Incentives
in the United States and the European Union, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 93, 113
(2008) (citing James R. Rogers, The Law and Policy of State Tax Competition:
Much Ado About Nothing?, 4 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 101, 110 (2006)).
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resource owners [may] use the tax savings more efficiently than state
governments.”27
However, another proponent of tax competition argues in favor
of discriminatory tax regimes.
Michael Keen, a professor of
Economics at the University of Essex, UK, reasons that these “tax
regimes are socially desirable because they protect tax revenues.” 28
Keen bases his argument on a model where tax competition is confined
to a mobile sector, while an immobile sector maintains or increases
high levels of taxation. A country using a discriminatory tax regime
“can protect its ability to collect a great deal of tax revenue from an
immobile base while at the same time competing with foreign
countries, through preferential taxation, for the other’s mobile base and
the marginal revenue increase it represents.” 29
In addition, tax competition promotes efficient allocation of
resources.30 Incentives create ideal matches between businesses and
localities whenever a locality understands its needs better than a
company. This understanding allows bidding to solve the “problem of
asymmetric distribution [of information] because the same firm
assumes different values in different jurisdictions and that additional
value is reflected in the bid.”31
If competition between states was restricted or restrained,
economic welfare may suffer 32 because in the absence of competition,
companies have “less incentive to be responsive to the desires of
consumers and less pressure to minimize costs.”33 Tax revenue
reductions that result when states give away tax incentives force state
governments to act more efficiently. 34

27
Kaye, supra note 26, at 113 (citing James R. Rogers, State Tax
Competition and Congressional Commerce Power: The Original Purchase of
Concurrent Taxing Authority, 7 REGENT U. L. REV. 103, 120 (1996)).
28
Kaye, supra note 26, at 113-14 (citing Michael Keen, Preferential
Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful, 54 NAT’L. TAX J. 757, 758
(2001)).
29
Id.
30
Id.; see also Rogers, supra note 26, at 108, 120.
31
Kaye, supra note 26, at 114 (citing Clayton P. Gillette, Business
Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 447, 453-58 (1997-1998).
32
Charles E. McLure, Tax Competition: Is What’s Good for the Private
Goose Also Good for the Public Gander?, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 341, 344 (1986).
33
Id.
34
Kaye, supra note 26, at 114; see also Rogers, supra note 26, at 109.
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2. BMW’S PROVISION OF EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME FOR
SOUTH CAROLINA RESIDENTS, BOTH DIRECTLY AND
INDIRECTLY
Raising income and creating jobs in South Carolina is an
important goal for policymakers and economic development advocates.
The State has a very low per capita income, and this trend is not new;
South Carolina has lagged behind the national average for decades.
Thus, attracting new investment, raising income, and creating jobs
remain the fundamental missions as policymakers attempt to increase
the standard of living in South Carolina.35 After the state’s investment
in BMW, the Upstate of South Carolina went through a drastic
economic shift from a textile-manufacturing region into an automotiveproduction region, which “has created a stronger automotive cluster
and a more diversified economy.” 36
BMW has contributed to South Carolina’s economy through
large-scale investment. Unique from other investments, “automotive
plants have outsized employment and income effects. This is because
they are final product producers (rather than intermediate producers in
a value chain) linked to a long sequence of economic activity.” 37
BMW’s cumulative investment reached more than $5 billion by the end
of 2007.38 The continual flow of capital into the BMW plant allows
South Carolina to remain a leader in “attracting inward foreign direct
investment.” This investment capital raises living standards for the
community by providing more employment opportunities. 39
The 2008 Moore School of Business study explains how BMW’s
business in Spartanburg County has spread economic benefits through
the multiplier effect, “an accepted and widely practiced technique used
to assess the total impact of investment and payroll.” 40 Using an interindustry model as a basis for calculating economic impacts, the study
calculated the “extent to which direct activities at the BMW plant
stimulate further economic effects, spreading employment and income .
. . .”41 First, economists assessed the initial effects of local payroll and
purchases at the automobile plant. They then examined indirect and

35

Woodward & Guimarães, supra note 25, at 6.
Id. at 4.
37
Id. at 5.
38
Id. at 1.
39
Id. at 6.
40
Id. at 7.
41
Id.
36
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induced effects that stem from the immediate effects of the local
payroll and purchases.
The study found that BMW has an especially large multiplier
effect for two main reasons: (1) BMW’s “extensive regional supplier
network and (2) its relatively large direct payroll, which is largely spent
at local businesses.”42 The regional supplier network is made up of
companies throughout North America from which BMW purchases
supplies, materials, and services; as a result, this network indirectly
creates more jobs and income. The suppliers with income from BMW
then re-spend that income, creating “additional indirect employment
and earnings as their purchases spread into the wider economy.” 43
Indirect effects are measured by employment; “[i]n this case, 1.87 jobs
are supported indirectly for every direct job at the BMW plant: 10,124
compared with 5,400.”44
The second main reason for BMW’s large multiplier effect is
called “the induced effect,” which stems from spending related to the
direct payroll. BMW’s $437 million of direct personal income paid to
their employees is subsequently spent at local businesses and on
various services, which leads to “further rounds of spending and
income.”45 The study found that the induced effect of BMW’s payroll
amounts to an employment of 7,526 workers, which is “significant for a
single plant.”46 The study found that BMW’s South Carolina
investment, through the multiplier effect, supports 23,050 jobs in the
state. While a typical employment multiplier for industries and
services in South Carolina is around two, “this total job impact yields a
multiplier of 4.3.”47
An input-output analysis generated by the same study indicated
the total output of BMW’s annual economic activities in 2007 to be
more than $8.8 billion. The plant accounts for $6.3 billion in annual
output, while the remainder consisted of output “through indirect and
induced linkages with the economy at large.” 48
While the present study concentrated mainly on BMW’s
economic impacts, the fiscal effects of employees paying property,
income, and sales taxes also benefit the community. A 2002 Moore
42

Id. at 8.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 9.
48
Id. at 11.
43
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School of Business study found that the four South Carolina counties
most affected by BMW’s presence—Anderson, Greenville, Laurens,
and Spartanburg—received $2.4 million each year in additional net
revenue.49
3. BMW’S INFLUENCE ON THE COMMUNITY
South Carolina, along with many regions worldwide, faces
economic and social development challenges. BMW has invested in
the state via its long-run sustainability goal; not only is a healthy
economy important, but the state must also maintain the natural
environment and social needs of the corporation through health and
education goals. BMW serves as an example of how other businesses
can and should sacrifice some of their solely profit-driven motive and
work for the prosperity of the state and its citizens.50
The BMW plant was first awarded ISO 1400151 in 1998.52 This
environmental certification is only given to facilities that meet or
exceed international environmental standards. 53 To qualify for an ISO
14001, the organization must meet standards of an Environmental
Management System (EMS) by way of “a policy statement which
includes commitments to prevention of pollution, continual
improvement of the EMS leading to improvements in overall
environmental performance, and compliance with all applicable
statutory and regulatory requirements.” 54
The international
environmental field attempts to establish systematic environmental
sustainability through this standard.55 In addition, BMW recommends
that its regional suppliers follow its example and institute forward-

49

Id. at 15.
Woodward & Guimarães, supra note 25, at 10.
51
The International Organization for Standardization 14001 requires an
organization to “put in place and implement a series of practices and
procedures that, when taken together, result in an environmental management
system.” This is a voluntary, international standard for companies to strive
toward. Environmental Management System/ISO 14001 – Frequently Asked
Questions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY [hereinafter EPA ISO 14001 FAQs]
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/wastewater/Environmental-Management-SystemISO-14001-Frequently-Asked-Questions.cfm (last updated Apr. 23, 2010).
52
Woodward & Guimarães, supra note 25, at 13.
53
Id
54
EPA ISO 14001 FAQs, supra note 52.
55
Woodward & Guimarães, supra note 25, at 13.
50
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Many of the suppliers have

Moreover, due to a progressive recycling program, the Landfill
Gas-to-Energy Project, and a heavy reliance on methane gas, BMW has
become a leader in the use of alternative energy. 58 In using methane,
BMW decreases the need for use of fossil fuels and greatly reduces the
total amount of carbon dioxide emissions. 59 BMW’s paint shop is also
environmentally cautious; energy generated by methane gas powers the
shop, and water-based paint is used instead of higher-solvent paints
with toxins.60 Companies like BMW, who are invested in and informed
about environmental sustainability, are pioneers in the field and bring
the best environmental practices to a state where a widespread positive
environmental attitude is lacking.
In addition to its environmental impact, large companies like
BMW support and fiscally impact the community via revenue
contributions “through employee property, income, and sales taxes.”61
In addition to providing revenue, generating community development is
important for a company. 62 Furthermore, national chains of restaurants
and motels, as well as retail stores and banks, bought land in the
surrounding counties to accommodate BMW’s new employees. This
new interest in Spartanburg-area land sent property values soaring;
experts estimated that land values increased by 25% in the year after
BMW announced its plans to build a plant in the Upstate. 63
South Carolina is currently host to the Information Technology
Research Center located on Clemson University’s campus in the
International Center for Automotive Research. 64 The center focuses on
maintenance-system automation, telematics, and onboard computing;
consequently, BMW’s investment is helping South Carolina’s effort “to
build a knowledge-based economy.”65 BMW also donates to local

56

Id.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 15.
62
Id.
63
Lyn Riddle, Real Estate; The BMW Plant Under Construction in South
Carolina is Pushing up Property Values Nearby, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at
D20, available at 1993 WLNR 3401201.
64
Id.
65
Id.
57
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vocational schools and K-12 education to improve the state’s school
system.66
B. CONS: BUYING JOBS CAN BE EXPENSIVE
1. ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATE TAX INCENTIVES
Legal scholars have analyzed the harmful effects of incentive
packages given by state and local governments. Opponents of state-tax
competition argue that tax incentives do not actually influence location
decisions of businesses.67 Incentives are only one factor among many
that businesses consider when deciding where to locate. 68 Peter D.
Enrich, professor of State and Local Taxation and State and Local
Government at Northeastern University School of Law, asserts that
“tax incentives . . . [,] even when they create significant differentials in
tax levels, simply are not large enough to exert substantial influence on
business location decisions.”69 The state and local taxes that businesses
must pay generally account for less than 2% of their total cost of
operating in the United States; therefore, a reduction of such costs do
not provide great leverage over their decisions to choose locations. 70
Since incentives have little weight in corporate decision-making,
and business investment would have happened anyway, it follows that
state tax incentives cause the “winning” state to lose substantial
revenue.71 “The majority of the creators of job and productivity gains
throughout a state’s economy are hurt as their taxes go up to pay for
infrastructure improvements, job-training subsidies, and other
enticements.”72
Tax incentive competition merely transports economic activity
from state to state, achieving zero-sum net gain on both the national
and local levels.73 Any increase of jobs and investment in one state is

66

Id. at 16.
Kaye, supra note 26, at 114.
68
Id.
69
Kaye, supra note 26, at 115 (quoting Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States
from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for
Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 337, 397 (1996)).
70
Kaye, supra note 26, at 115.
71
See Enrich, supra note 70, at 405.
72
Kaye, supra note 26, at 115 (quoting John Hood, Ante Freeze: Stop the
State Bidding Wars for Big Business, 68 POL’Y REV. 62, 62 (1994)).
73
Kaye, supra note 26, at 115.
67
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offset by an equal loss through incentive wars by another state. 74 In
fact, competitive efforts of states are likely to cancel out any benefits
that states that offer tax incentives may reap, which “can be a negativesum game that produces a net loss.” 75
The models that proponents of tax incentive packages use to
demonstrate benefits of preferential tax regimes are based on extreme
assumptions that a government’s main goal would be revenue
maximization.76 These assumptions “make the oversimplified model’s
practical relevance and applicability tenuous at best.” 77 Such a model
fails to account for governmental interests other than revenue
maximization.78 Additionally, the models may be flawed.
[When designing models to explain the benefits
of tax incentives,] it cannot be assumed that
immobile bases are perfectly inelastic; at some point
the shifting tax burden will become too onerous
causing the immobile base to become mobile. A
model should not assume that high tax rates do not
exacerbate diminishing marginal returns to labor. By
reducing the return an individual receives for his or
her labor, the opportunity cost of engaging in
income-producing activities increases. This, in turn,
would cause productivity to stagnate, if not decline,
leading to a reduction in the tax revenue collected
from the immobile base. Absent the existence of
circumstances in practice that mirror the model’s
assumptions,
the
strong
conclusion
that
discriminatory taxation is desirable and beneficial

74
Kaye, supra note 26, at 115-16 (citing The National Economic Policy
Implications of State Tax Incentive Competition: Hearing on “Cuno and
Competitiveness: Where to Draw the Line” Before the Subcomm. on Int’l
Trade of the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Peter
Fisher) [hereinafter Statement of Fisher]).
75
Enrich, supra note 70, at 397; Amicus Curiae Brief of Economics and
Public Policy Professors et al. in Support of Respondents at 21,
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (Nos. 04-1704, 04-1724).
76
Kaye, supra note 26, at 116.
77
Id.; see also Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, Reply: Consumption
Taxation Is Still Superior to Income Taxation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 789, 790
(2007) (noting that the strong conclusions of simplified models are likely to be
weakened by more complex models).
78
Kaye, supra note 26, at 116 (citing Michael Keen, Preferential Regimes
Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 757, 759 (2001)).
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must be discounted and found to be unpersuasive in
practice.79
Further, “once a state lures a targeted business, it must pay for
public service support for the business in the form of infrastructure and
transportation costs, while leaving the previous state with redundant
public service support infrastructure.”80 Enrich describes the states as
being caught in the classic prisoners’ dilemma: If every state refrains
from offering location incentives to target businesses, all states could
keep bigger tax bases to support other substantial governmental
functions. However, if some states choose to offer tax incentives, then
no state can afford the political cost of abstaining, resulting in
incentives proliferating and leaving all the states in a worse position. 81
2. BMW IN SOUTH CAROLINA: DID WE ESSENTIALLY BUY
JOBS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED?
While BMW’s positive economic impact on South Carolina is
apparent, some opponents of incentives packages argue that buying
jobs can be expensive.82 Southern states may be in danger by expecting
too much from the automobile industry.83 South Carolina’s corporate
giveaways have been described as “promiscuous” and the state’s
business tax a mere footnote to the state budget. 84 Will South Carolina
really give anything to a company to avoid losing a business to Georgia
or Alabama?85
BMW’s South Carolina plant has escaped
millions of dollars in taxes and costs that industrial
companies expect to pay in developed nations.
....
. . . The company pays $1 a year to lease its
$36 million piece of land. It pays no land tax to
79
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Spartanburg County. Building and equipment tax on
the first phase of BMW's plant is 43 percent lower
than what established businesses have to pay. Tax
discounts on BMW's second phase are even bigger -62 percent -- even though the expansion couldn't
have been built anywhere but Greer.
....
BMW uses as many services as other
companies. Its 2,500 employees have just as many
school-age children as workers at other businesses.
Its trucks wear down South Carolina's roads just as
much as other companies' trucks. Thanks to the
incentives war between the states, however, BMW
has been able to carve its own special deal, a deal
shielding it from obligations for other services that
most South Carolina companies accept as the cost of
doing business.86
Other state “[s]ubsidy winners include amusement parks, cable
makers, data-storage firms, . . . food warehouses, furniture-foam
makers, printers, metal fabricators, health-product distributors, textile
companies, telephone-call centers and magazine sellers.”87 Many of
these businesses, as was the case with BMW’s parts suppliers, planned
on locating in South Carolina regardless of whether BMW chose South
Carolina, but managed to extract “millions in incentives that were there
for the taking.”88
The revenue lost when states give away incentive packages
makes it more difficult for those states to finance important functions
like state education, police and fire departments, transportation
systems, and utilities programs. States must continue to increase taxincentive offers in order to keep up with each other and to lure
businesses; but this competition undermines the ability of states to
finance the investments in education and infrastructure that actually
provide the foundations for future economic growth. 89
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III. GOVERNMENTAL IMPACT: HOW INCENTIVE PACKAGES AFFECT
STATE GOVERNMENT
A. COLLAPSING STATE GOVERNMENT: TREATING THE BOEING
DEAL AS TOP-SECRET
“South Carolina lawmakers seemed euphoric when they
unanimously passed legislation in a special session on [October 28,
2009] to clear the way for the Chicago-based company[, Boeing,] to
land a final assembly plant in North Charleston, passing out special
aerospace coins and lapel pins to commemorate the occasion.” 90
“Lawmakers and lobbyists around the State House said they had never
seen leaders of the House and Senate work so cooperatively before.” 91
The reason for the Bill’s unanimous approval in the state legislature
could be due to the legislature’s failure to exercise due diligence and
object to voting on a bill name without details. However, the reason
also could lie with the failure of the leadership in adequately informing
the House and the Senate of Boeing’s price tag. Either way, a failed
legislative process resulted in the Boeing Bill’s passage. 92
This failed legislative process is due to what Edward Zelinsky
calls “an inherent and irremediable information asymmetry in
negotiations between state and local officials and the corporations and
developers with which such officials bargain over tax incentives.” 93
Corporations know their exact situs preferences, and they “have no
reason to disclose these to the officials with whom they are bargaining
for tax benefits.”94 In fact, corporations have great incentive to hide
their preferences and deliver a message through negotiations that if
local governments do not offer tax incentives, their community will not
reap the benefits of the corporation building there. 95 “If community X
refuses to grant tax incentives to attract or retain a particular firm,
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community Y will.”96 Therefore, community X’s refusal to offer
incentives would prove very risky for local officials, who are often
elected for short periods of time, but “[t]he costs of tax incentives often
extend far into the future.”97 Most elected officials and voters are
concentrated on the present and do not look very far into the future.
Consequently, elected officials may gain political advantage by voting
in favor of granting tax incentives that have immediate and apparent
benefits. However, the negative consequences of those benefits, “costs
in the form of reduced tax revenues[,] do not appear until many years
later, when others will be in office.” 98
B. OPPORTUNITY COST ANALYSIS
Incentives given to multinational corporations drain the general
income of the pursuing state. The logical question follows: could a
state that gives a corporation such a generous incentive package have
spent those funds in a more opportunistic way to produce a stronger
and more sustainable economy? “The concept of opportunity cost
examines what is the highest valued alternative that is foregone when
one activity is chosen over another.”99 Although opportunity costs are
rarely considered when dealing with state competition through
incentives,100 government actions are not a costless activity.101
Revenue lost through incentive packages is revenue that could
have helped finance the state’s education, transportation, police, fire,
and utilities programs. States that continually increase tax incentives
above those of other states in order to lure businesses undermine “the
ability of state and local government to finance the investments in
public education and infrastructure that provide the foundation for
future economic growth.”102
When faced with a “wrecked budget that threatens [public]
schools, colleges and law enforcement,” should the legislature have
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borrowed $270 million to build an assembly line? 103 Keep in mind that
the total amount borrowed by South Carolina over the next fifteen years
amounts to about $83,000 for each of the Boeing plant’s 3,800
employees.104 Further, small South Carolina businesses may suffer lost
goodwill as a result of incentives packages being given to larger out-ofstate corporations.
However, the 3,800 jobs that Boeing is projected to create will
not solely employ current South Carolina residents. Those jobs are
expected to employ a mix of currently unemployed South Carolina
residents and residents seeking higher salary jobs. In addition, highlyqualified executives and highly-skilled engineers will be brought in
from out of state for select higher-level positions. Assuming that at
least 1,000 of the 3,800 Boeing jobs will be these higher-level jobs,
South Carolina will automatically attract those people of higher
educational backgrounds. South Carolina will collect income taxes
from those people. Assuming most of these non-resident employees
are married and have families, they will bring their spouses with them,
who will also work in South Carolina, educate their children in South
Carolina, buy homes and pay property taxes in South Carolina, and
become consumers in a state whose economy is in desperate need of all
of the above. Houses that were empty will be filled, new business will
be created, and hard-working, driven people will rear and educate their
families in South Carolina.
Additionally, South Carolinian companies will be hired to build
many of the buildings. By proving to other industries and companies
the state’s willingness and eagerness to successfully integrate new
businesses into South Carolina, the state will attract more new
businesses in the future. While there are staunch negatives in this
opportunity-cost analysis, the overall future opportunity benefits
probably outweigh any costs.
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IV. THE SOUTH CAROLINA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 2010:
WHY ITS CHALLENGERS WERE WRONG
“A presumption and hallmark of federalism mandates that states
have general police powers over their internal affairs. The creation and
structuring of economic incentives . . . are, and have historically been,
within this purview of states’ rights.” 105 Offering state incentives is an
exercise of a state’s broad police power. 106 “States enjoy comparative
informational advantages over the federal government and are more
competent at enacting effective economic measures.”107 Because states
across the country have different needs, each state should be capable of
assessing their own economic needs and structuring a system that
works best for their citizens.
The South Carolina Economic Development Competitiveness
Act of 2010 (“Act”) was proposed with the purposes of promoting
business expansion using state incentives, phasing out South Carolina’s
corporate income tax, and improving the reward for employers who
create new jobs.108 An economic development committee, composed
of six business leaders and assembled by S.C. House Speaker Bobby
Harrell, drafted the Act.109 Their goal was “to pick through the state’s
existing laws, looking for ways to sweeten the deal for companies as
they look to emerge from weathering the economic recession.”110
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After passing through both the House and the Senate, Governor
Sanford signed the Act into law on June 23, 2010.111 Before passage, a
few major concerns with the proposed Act existed. Some were worried
that the Act could spur business owners to hire employees more quickly
because they may be eligible for generous tax breaks for each new
worker. Also, many feared the Act would come at the expense of some
state and property tax revenues.
The main concern with the Act involved the proposed gradual
elimination of South Carolina’s corporate income tax. This is “a move
that would strip hundreds of millions of dollars from already depleted
state coffers and fail to provide any relief to more than 95 percent of
the state’s businesses.”112 Four other states, Wyoming, South Dakota,
Washington and Nevada, have already eliminated corporate income
tax.113 Doing so will hopefully catch the attention of companies
looking to expand operations, but it is open to debate as to whether
eliminating the tax will greatly affect the state’s revenue.114 Most small
businesses in South Carolina pay no corporate income tax anyhow
because most are registered as “entities” other than “corporations.” 115
In addition, the two main sources of tax revenue for the state are sales
tax and individual income taxes.116 While corporate income tax, a tax
on a business’s profit, adds to the state’s revenue, it amounts to the
“smallest component of the state’s three-pronged income tax collection
strategy.”117
Proponents of the Act, however, claimed that the Act was just a
“tweaking” of existing incentives programs, which South Carolina
needed to better utilize. Section 11-18-60 of the bill allowed South
Carolina counties to pool their bond capacities.118
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Each county received small increments from the federal stimulus
bill in 2009, but these amounts are so small that few government
agencies have been able to spend it. By pooling the bonds, counties
working together will raise enough money for public infrastructure
projects and economic development projects that each county would
not have been able to accomplish on its own. In addition, the Act gave
the State Ports Authority an $8 million pool of tax breaks, which they
can offer to port users that are boosting their business and encourage
port development.
“The value of
[the] state’s existing job
development tax credits, which company executives can use to cut
down on paying employee withholding income taxes, would be
doubled, but the length of time employers have to claim them would
[be] shortened over time, balancing out the expense.”119
While the proposed bill passed with flying colors in the House,
South Carolina state senators found it more difficult to agree that the
benefits of the bill outweighed the negatives.120 The senators were
concerned with losing the “5 percent” of revenue that the state usually
counts on from corporations; roughly $167 million usually enters the
state general fund each year.121 These funds are then “used to run state
agencies and programs that serve S[outh] C[arolina] residents.”122
Senator Billy O’Dell, chair of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on
Sales and Income Tax, said his committee ran critical tests. 123 After the
measure passed O’Dell’s subcommittee, the bill went “immediately to
the full Senate Finance Committee for consideration.”124 The Senate
Finance Committee passed the bill with an overwhelming vote of 18-0.
Many of the Senate’s fears should have been eliminated after the
Senate Finance Committee’s unanimous vote in favor of the bill and
because several of the bill’s most worrisome components were
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amended before the House passed the bill. 125 As it stood before the
Senate, the corporate tax phase-out would not have begun until two
years from the enactment of the legislation, as many hoped that the
economy would rebound by then.126 Also, the bill contained a tax
credit for small businesses with five employees or fewer, if they add
workers. The bill, which was sponsored by Harrell, had more than one
hundred House members as co-signers.127
The four states that have already eliminated their corporate
income tax provided great insight for what may come in South
Carolina. Despite that insight, experts warn that these states “have
found the incentives to be severe under-performers,”128 instead of the
“game-changer in luring industry and creating jobs.”129 Michael
Mazerov, an analyst for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in
Washington, said that eliminating the tax has “been anything but a
game-changer.”130 Mazerov believes “too much emphasis and hype”
has been placed on cutting business taxes as a way to increase state
income.131 While a handful of other states have eliminated the
corporate income tax, they all replaced the tax with some other revenue
stream or broad-based substitute.132 “Nevada relies on its gambling
appeal to fill [the revenue] void . . . and Wyoming relies on its rich oil
and gas reserves.”133
V. THE OPPONENTS’ REFUGE IN THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress alone has the
power to regulate interstate commerce. 134 When Congress does not
exercise this power, legal scholars call it a dormant power. In
Daimlerchrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Supreme Court held that the “state
taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or
spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.” 135
Thus, a federal court is not an appropriate forum for a taxpayer to
125
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challenge a state incentive. The Cuno decision clarified that having the
status of a state taxpayer is not enough for standing under the United
States Constitution.136 In order for a citizen to bring a Commerce
Clause challenge to a state tax incentive program in federal court, the
taxpayer “must establish that he has sustained a direct injury as a result
of the challenged tax scheme.”137 The injury must not be hypothetical
or generally common to people.138 However, the requirements for a
taxpayer to sue in state court may not be as stringent. 139
States that compete for the tax-incentive-recipient corporations
may be in a good position to raise a federal court claim.140 Enrich
asserts that these states are in the position to challenge state tax
incentives as the “most direct losers in the ongoing incentive
competition.”141 Secondly, Enrich argues that “‘states are particularly
appropriate parties to bring Commerce Clause issues before the courts’
because the Commerce Clause’s ‘primary focus concerns the structural
dangers posed to the federal system by excessive state interference with
the dynamics of the national economy.’” 142 Each state has a “peculiarly
direct and compelling interest in the enforcement of this structural
safeguard of federalism.”143 The states, however, seem to have no
interest in protecting their citizens and challenging tax incentive
programs because “more than half the states and several U.S.
Territories filed an amicus brief together in support of petitioners’
argument that Ohio’s [investment tax credit] did not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause.”144
The alternative venue for pursuing challenges is in state court. In
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, the United States Supreme Court distinguished
a state taxpayer’s standing in state court versus federal court. 145 The
Court stated that in federal court, “[the Court] ha[s already] likened
state taxpayers to federal taxpayers, and thus [it has] refused to confer
standing upon a state taxpayer absent a showing of ‘direct injury,’
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pecuniary or otherwise.”146 The Court, however, differentiated state
taxpayers’ standing in state court:
“[T]he constraints of Article III do not apply to
state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not
bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or
other federal rules of justiciability even when they
address issues of federal law, as when they are called
upon to interpret the Constitution . . . .” Given the
Kadish decision, it is clear that states are not bound to
adhere to the “case-or-controversy” doctrine. Thus, it
appears that state court, as opposed to federal court,
will more likely address the merits of a state
taxpayer’s challenge to a state tax incentive. 147
While the standing rules change from state to state, litigation
against various state incentive programs is underway. For example, the
North Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law (NCICL) represented
several North Carolina taxpayer groups in challenging incentives
offered to companies that invested in the state.148 One case arose when
North Carolina’s state and local governments planned to provide Dell
Inc. “with $279 million in various tax incentives and subsidies to build
a computer manufacturing and distribution facility in the state.” 149
Relying on the Commerce Clause and a number of state constitutional
arguments, the taxpayers sought to challenge the state’s tax incentive
package. “The North Carolina Superior Court dismissed the complaint
due to lack of standing. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina
affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the taxpayers lacked
standing.”150
Another North Carolina case, which is ongoing, involves a group
of taxpayers who are also represented by NCICL. This group is
challenging “an economic development incentive granted to a wholly
owned subsidiary of Google, Inc.”151 Included in the $165 million
package is total relief of “business personal property taxes and an 80%
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refund of real property taxes for the next 30 years.” 152 This group also
raised numerous violations of provisions found in the North Carolina
constitution.153
Recently, the NCICL has filed two more lawsuits on behalf of
concerned taxpayers. They filed the first case in Wake County
Superior Court after the county gave Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company and Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. a sixty million
dollar incentive package.154 A second case was filed in Durham
County Superior Court and challenged the county’s plan to give the
Nitronex Corporation $100,000 in subsidies if the corporation would
move to Durham County from another North Carolina county. 155
Instead of relying on the Commerce Clause, both of these complaints
allege violations of the North Carolina constitution. 156
Similar to the North Carolina cases, Minnesota taxpayers brought
suit against the state because of the state’s Job Opportunity Building
Zone (JOBZ) program.157 This program allows local governments in
the state to grant “a variety of incentives and credits to businesses that
relocate to, or expand employment or capital investment in designated
zones.”158 The taxpayers’ main argument was that the JOBZ program
violated the Commerce Clause. They claimed that this program used
“unfair inducement to expand in the designated zones in Minnesota
rather than in some other state.”159 Even though taxpayer standing in
state court is easier to achieve than in federal court, “the Court of
Appeals of Minnesota dismissed the suit because the lack of an injuryin-fact deprived the challengers of standing.” 160 However, a different
group of Minnesota taxpayers is raising a new challenge to the JOBZ
program. This time the challenge may “withstand a motion to dismiss[,
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b]ecause it ‘directly compete[s] with businesses receiving benefits
under JOBZ’”;161 so it claims to have an injury-in-fact.
Lawsuits against incentives in states other than North Carolina
and Minnesota will most likely face “a fate similar to the dismissed
cases in North Carolina and Minnesota[,] . . . where the state trial
judges ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the tax
incentives under the Commerce Clause.”162
VI. CONCLUSION: BENEFITS OF RECRUITING MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS IN THE SOUTH
In conclusion, by examining how states in the recent past have
used incentive packages to entice companies to their respective states,
the distinct advantages of companies choosing to accept lucrative
incentive packages become evident. Building a plant in a relatively
unknowledgeable and ill-equipped region may have major pay-offs for
companies in the form of tax incentives. South Carolina may soon be
able to offer even greater incentives to build in the state due to the
aforementioned Act, which eliminates or greatly reduces corporate
income tax.
A large company may boost state morale by being a shining
example of environmental sustainability; may provide the technology
standards and train employees to form a knowledge-based community;
and may directly and indirectly create jobs for those in the community
and the greater region. However, opposition to state incentive
packages remains. Opponents argue that the money that states are
spending competing with each other to “win” the companies and have
them build in their respective states could be better spent elsewhere.
Instead of “buying” these companies, states should put money into their
public education systems and use that money efficiently to educate
their citizens and form knowledge-based communities.
However, it is increasingly important for America to stay
competitive in attracting and retaining businesses that are competing in
a global market. As demonstrated, the states have an important role
within our federal system in providing attractive business opportunities
to lure and retain these businesses. In this age of globalization,
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“perhaps the most pragmatic advantage to state participation in foreign
commerce is the flexibility it allows.” 163 International trade between
countries and states has been dramatically increased through economic
globalization in the past twenty years. “Interstate competition is a fact
in our federalist system, and we must not overlook the growth and
acceptance of state action in trade and investment. In general,
‘subnational governments within federal systems worldwide have taken
an increased interest in the conduct of foreign affairs.’”164 The use of
state tax incentives is steadily growing, and as long as states continue to
use more credits for job training, employment opportunities, education
of the community, development of businesses, and other positive uses,
potential for economic tax incentives is endless. For states that utilize
these incentives, “[i]t is a matter of survival.” 165
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